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Introduction. The United States is 
committed as a matter of national 
policy to enter into negotiations with all 
countries in the United Nations in a 
serious attempt to bring the law of the 
sea in line with " ... the needs of 
modem technology and the concerns of 
the international community."l These 
needs and concerns are numerous and 
often conflicting, and their resolution is 
complicated by the fact that even the 
preliminary negotiations are being con-
ducted in the political forum of the 
United Nations rather than on a quieter 
technical level as in the case of the 1958 
conventions. 2 If a general codification 
of principles for the law of the sea is to 
be agreed upon, then common interests 
and elements upon which agreement can 
be based must be found, and found in 
relatively short order or the Law of the 
Sea Conference scheduled for the 
summer of 1973 will surely founder on 
its own rhetoric. The place for agree-
ment to start is in the area in which the 
affected interests are least entrenched. 
Using this criterion one can quickly 
eliminate the issues of territorial seas 
and the right of free transit since na-
tional security interests are involved. 
Likewise legal clarification of the sea-
ward limit of the Continental Shelf can 
be eliminated because strong interests in 
oil, fisheries, et cetera, are intimately 
connected with this question. The 
highly emotional question of pollution 
in the oceans is recognized to be a part 
of the larger question of the total 
environment and as such is being dealt 
with in a separate conference. Further 
away from land, the so-called high seas 
are again connected with national 
security interests, and the water column 
beneath them is the concern of strongly 
entrenched fishing interests. The deep 
seabed is another matter, and it is here 
that interests appear least entrenched. 
There are two reasons for saying this. 
First, commercial recovery of any deep 
seabed resource has not started. Second, 
on a national and international political 
scale there appears to be general agree-
ment that the deep seabed and its 
resources should be reserved for all of 
mankind. The "property of mankind 
concept" appears then to serve a useful 
purpose as a starting point from which 
more general agreement can commence. 
Indeed, the disagreement that exists on 
the deep seabeds is not to whom do 
they belong, but rather on the form of 
an international regime to oversee them. 
Resources of the Deep Seabed. If 
there were nothing of interest to na-
tions, industries, or individuals upon or 
under the seabed, then agreement on an 
international regime would be a rela-
tively easy matter.3 Indeed, a simple 
scientific coordination agency such as 
the existing International Oceano-
graphic Commission would suffice. Such 
is not the case, however, and a summary 
of the known mineral wealth of the 
oceans which is important to the prob-
lem of international agreement is given 
by Wang. 4 In the deep oceans, recovery 
of metal-rich oozes is speculated about, 
as is the existence of oil and vein 
mineral deposits, but the only resource 
which has been identified beyond the 
speculation stage are manganese nod-
ules. These deposits are of particular 
interest in this paper since their occur-
rence in grades of commercial interest 
occurs in depths generally in excess of 
3,000 meters, in geographical areas far 
from even the most liberal interpreta-
tions of the boundary of the Continen-
tal Shelf, and well within the area 
considered the property of all mankind. 
Manganese Nodules as a Resource. 
That interest in the nodules as are-
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source has passed beyond the specu-
lation stage or that of oceanographic 
curiosity is amply demonstrated by the 
fact that today no less than 33 major 
companies have active programs of ex-
ploration and development. These in-
clude Deep Sea Ventures (Tenneco), 
Kennecott Exploration (Kennecott 
Copper), Hughes Tool, Lockheed and 
Global Marine, Ocean Resources, Metall-
gesellschaft, Kaiser, International 
Nickel, Nippon Steel, Sumimoto, Mitsu-
bishi, Mitsui, Societe Ie Nickel, et 
cetera. 5 If one is to deal with the 
problem of policy formation concerning 
the resources of the deep seabed, then 
the place to start is with the least 
abstract resource, the manganese nod-
ules. 
In focusing on the manganese nod-
ules one is immediately confronted with 
the question of why major companies 
from the United States, Japan, Ger-
many, and France are interested in these 
as a resource. 
The answer to this essentially lies in 
the composition of the nodules, the 
location of analogous land deposits, and 
the location of the companies involved. 
The major elements composing manga-
nese nodules are silica, manganese, 
copper, iron, nickel, cobalt, lead, and 
aluminum. Of particular interest are 
cobalt, copper, nickel, and manganese. 
Over 80 percent of the world's supply 
of cobalt comes from the Congo. The 
United States produces only slight 
amounts as byproducts of the copper 
industry. Germany, France, and Japan 
produce none. The principal use of 
cobalt is as a high-temperature alloying 
agent in steel. Russia produces over 60 
percent of the world's manganese. Man-
ganese is vital to the steelmaking proc-
ess. Nickel is also used, principally as an 
alloying agent in steel. In many in-
stances nickel and cobalt are inter-
changeable. Japan, the United States, 
Germany, and France rank in the top 
five as producers of steel, but none have 
major land-based deposits of com-
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TABLE I 
Metal % Drywgt Content of Nodulesa Principal Land-based Producersb 
Low High 
Cobalt 0_2 0_5 Congo, Zambia 
Copper 1.2 1.6 United States, U.S.S.R., Zambia, 
Chile 
Nickel 1.2 1.6 Canada, New Caledonia, U.S.S.R., 
Cuba 
Manganese 20.0 25.0 U.S.S.R., Brazil, Republic of 
South Africa, India, Ghana 
Source: aThese are generally accepted values obtained by personal contact 
with geologists at Woods Hole and various companies. 
bCommodity Yearbook 1971_ For a complete listing of the more than 50 
manganese producing countries, see U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Mines, 
"Manganese in 1963, Mineral Industry Surveys. 
mercially minable manganese, cobalt, or 
nickel. Known world reserves of high 
and good grade manganese ores, cobalt 
ores, and nickel ores appear to be 
adequate to supply all known and fore-
cast needs well into the 21st century. 6 
None of these strategic mineral deposits 
exist in the major non-Communist coun-
tries. On the other hand, the principal 
producing countries are, with the excep-
tion of Canada, countries which either 
have relatively unstable governments or 
are not particularly friendly with this 
country or the other major free world 
steel producers. It would seem desirable 
from a national security point of view 
to develop an independent source of 
these ores. 
Indeed, this point seems to have been 
recognized for some time. In particular 
regard to the sea, the 1966 Marine 
Resources and Engineering Develop-
men t Act declares that "The marine 
science activities of the United States 
should be conducted so as to contribute 
to the following objectives": and lists as 
the first objective "The accelerated de-
velopment of the resources of the 
marine environment.,,7 The 1968 Re-
port of the President to the Congress on 
Marine Resources and Engineering 
Development notes the national need 
for "continuous access to an adequate, 
dependable, and economic supply of 
raw materials to meet the demands of 
an expanding population with a rising 
standard of living." It further sets the 
criteria for Federal policy designed to 
implement this. The policies should 
contribute to economic development 
and national security by assisting the 
Nation in: 
• developing adequate and depend-
able supplies of needed mineral raw 
materials; 
• acquiring mineral supplies at low-
est costs consistent with the satisfaction 
of other national objectives; 
• emphasizing domestic supplies of 
mineral resources to assist in maintain-
ing favorable balance of payments; 
• providing a climate for American 
industry to produce efficiently under 
competitive conditions, the minerals re-
quired for ~e domestic economy and 
foreign trade; 
• conserving the Nation's mineral 
resources by using them wisely and 
efficiently; 
• preserving the quality of the en-
vironment while obtaining needed 
minerals. 
These criteria are repeated in subse-
quent reports made by the International 
Oceanographic Commission throughout 
its entire existence. 
The Bureau of Mines has a long 
history of having supported develop-
ment and exploitation of low-grade 
domestic deposits of manganese. Never-
theless, there is no such project cur-
rently in existence. David B. Brooks in 
his 1966 book Low Grade and Non-
Conventional Sources of Manganese 8 
clearly sets forth that, of the possible 
alternate sources of manganese not re-
siding in foreign territory, the deep sea 
manganese nodules were the most at-
tractive and the most likely to be 
economically feasible. The only domes-
tic sources of cobalt are closely tied to 
copper because the production of cobalt 
in this country is strictly as a byproduct 
of the smelting and refining processes of 
the domestic copper industry. 9 
In the preceding few paragraphs the 
first of the pressures upon any interna-
tional convention becomes clear. It is 
the highly developed nations which are 
interested in exploiting the sea. It is in 
their national interests to do so. In the 
United States, to do so is clearly stated 
national objective and policy. Hence, 
any international agreement which must 
be submitted for ratification to the U.S. 
Senate clearly must foster the exploita-
tion of the deep sea resources. On the 
other hand, the nations which have 
major land-based deposits with which 
the minerals from manganese nodules 
must compete all belong to the group 
called the emerging or developing na-
tions, and their interests would be to 
protect their own production. Hence, 
any international regime from their 
point of view should be, in general, 
repressive of deep sea mining. I 0 Any 
agreement or convention which hopes 
to be useful must provide for a recon-
ciliation of these views. 
Less disagreement exists concerning 
the copper contained in the nodules. 
The United States is a major producer 
with only Chile and the Congo having 
substantial deposits among the de-
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vel oping nations. The static reserve in-
dex of the Bureau of Mines indicates a 
40-year world reserve of copper at 
current usage. However, this index is 
based on a linear usage prediction while, 
in fact, both domestic and world con-
sumption of copper has been increasing 
exponentially. In the case of copper this 
increase has been about 3 percent per 
year even with the considerable material 
substitution and scrap recovery efforts 
that currently exist. Calculations using 
this more realistic exponential usage 
curve show a world reserve of only 26 
years. In other words, we are possibly 
coming toward a period of resource 
deficiency. I I A good illustration of the 
advanced degree of depletion of copper 
reserves lies in the fact that some 60 
years ago the raw ore extracted from 
the earth contained an average of 1.88 
percent copper. Today it contains about 
0.7 percent. I 2 When one considers that 
the analysis of copper in manganese 
nodules has produced results ranging 
from 0.3 percent to over 3 percent with 
an average in many areas of over 1 
percent,13 the potential importance of 
the source can be seen. 
Economic Aspects of Nodule Mining 
and Production. It would seem to be in 
the international interest to develop a 
new source of copper. The nodules 
present such a new source. The diffi-
culty in this approach of using copper as 
a common meeting ground lies in the 
economics of mining and extraction of 
the minerals from the nodules. The 
nodules which are minerally enriched 
generally lie at depths of 3-5 km., thus 
requiring development of new tech-
nology to gather or mine them. Further, 
the copper and other minerals contained 
in them are imbedded in a silica matrix 
unlike any mineral deposits found on 
land. Thus, in general, land-based 
methods which are well developed will 
not work on the deep sea nodules. 1 4 
Mining of any mineral deposit, be it 
land- or sea-based, requires very high 
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levels of capital investment. In the case 
of the sea-based mines the new tech-
nology required adds a high risk factor 
onto the high capitalization. Alvin 
KauJfman of the Bureau of Mines 
gathered together many estimates. 1 5 
Independent investigation has revealed 
that, in general, the higher estimates of 
Kauffman for production costs are 
those in use today. The cost of opera-
tion can be said to be relatively low. 
When one considers the cost of capital 
in with the cost of operation, then the 
total cost presents a different picture. 
Table III assumes in all cases an 
output of 1 million tons per year, taxes 
at 50 percent of return on invested 
capital. Kauffman assumed a 12 percent 
return on $100 million before taxes. 
This paper uses 30 percent return on an 
investment of $200 million before 
taxes. 1 6 The total costs of a manganese 
nodule mining and refining company 
can be seen to be somewhat higher than 
previously thought, and the dominant 
factor in the operation is clearly the 
TABLE II-ESTIMATED COSTS OF PRODUCING METALS FROM 
THE DEEP SEA MANGANESE NODULES ($/TON) 
Cost Item Kauffman This Papera 
Exploration $ .70 $ .70 
Lease Acquisition 2:50 
Mining Cost 5.00 4.00 
Transportation to Shore 1.00 1.00 
Unloading 1.00 1.00 
Benefication 2.00 2.00 
Processing 20.00 20.00 
Waste Disposal 
(Environmental Protection) 5.00 5.00 
Overhead 4.00 4.00 
Cost of Operation $41.20 $37.70 
Source: aNo lease acquisition costs are included because they in part depend 
on the regime under which rights are granted. Mining costs are based on those of 
John L. Mero, Offshore Technology Conference 1971, Paper No. OTC 1410. 
Processing costs are based on a process such as reported by Deep Sea Ventures in 
D.M. Taylor, "Worthless Nodules Become Valuable," Ocean Industry, June 1971, 
p. 27-28. All other costs are those of Kauffman in lieu of better figures. 
TABLE III-TOTAL COSTS OF PRODUCING MANGANESE NODULES (S/TON) 
Cost Item Kauffman This Paper 
4 year Writeoff 6 year Writeoff 8 year Writeoff 
Return on Capital 
Investment $ 6.00 $ 30.00 $ 30.00 S 30.00 
Taxes 6.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
Depreciation 50.00 33.33 25.00 
Cost of Capital $12.00 $110.00 $ 93.33 $ 85.00 
Cost of Operation 
(From Table II) 41.20 37.70 37.70 37.70 
Total Cost of 
Production $53.20 $147.70 $131.03 S122.70 
capital involved. The viability of the 
industry can be examined by comparing 
the recoverable value to the total cost. 
No single answer is apparent here. Using 
1970 average market prices, J 7 assuming 
an optimistic 100 percent recovery of 
the metals from the nodule, and using 
the metal content range from table I, 
the recoverable value of a million tons 
of nodules would be as shown in table 
IV. 
What is immediately apparent from 
comparing these figures with the costs 
involved is that the whole operation is 
somewhat marginal. If one is interested 
only in the copper, nickel, and cobalt 
content, then the capital investment 
required had better be less than $100 
million. Considering that projected capi-
tal costs for the recovery of the same 
tonnage of nickel from lateritic ores as 
from a million-ton nodule operation, 
according to Le Que, is over $200 
million, J 8 serious doubt is cast on the 
credibility of the $100 million capital 
investment figures. It is obvious that if 
$200 million is required for a million 
ton nodule operation, it will be profit-
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able only if the manganese is recovered 
and used in competition with the exist-
ing ferromanganese market. Even in this 
case the operation, while definitely 
viable, leaves little margin for error in 
cost estimation or for market fluctua-
tions. 
The Problem of Market Impact. If 
the nodules are to be mined then for 
their total mineral content, they will be 
in competition with land-based sources 
of many countries and will have an 
effect on and be affected by the manga-
nese, copper, nickel, and cobalt mar-
kets. The question then is to what 
degree is the concern of the developing 
countries justified? To put this in per-
spective, assume the same million ton 
per year operation presented in table I. 
Bertrand de Jouvenil has estimated that 
such an operation would yield the fol-
lowing as shown in table V. 
While these figures would tend to indi-
cate that the impact of a million tons of 
nodules per year would be minimal, this 
is not necessarily so. The true impact of 
the metals from the nodules derives 
TABLE IV-RECOVERABLE VALUE OF METALS 
FROM DEEP SEA MANGANESE NODULES ($/TON) 
Metal High Content Value Low Content Value 
Nickel $ 41.00 $30.50 
Copper 19.30 14.40 
Cobalt 18.50 7.40 
Total Recoverable Value 
Without Manganese $ 78.80 $52.30 
Managanese Considered 
As a 50% Mn. Content 
Ore Equivalent $ 13.25 $10.60 
Recoverable Value 
of Other Metals 78.80 52.30 
Total Recoverable Value $ 92.05 $62.90 
Manganese Considered 
As a Ferromanganese Equivalent $ 47.50 $38.00 
Recoverable Value 
of Other Minerals 78.80 ~ 



















Source: Bertrand de Jouvenil, "The Economic Potential of the Oceans," Paper 
prepared for Pacem in Maribus working group meeting, October 1971. 
from the fact that they act and are 
classed as commodities. A commodity 
exhibits the following characteristics: 
• It is in differentiable. Thus no pro-
ducer can obtain a higher price or better 
trading terms through advertising or 
product modification. He must accept 
the open market price which prevails at 
the time of the sale. 
• Its marginal production costs, 
labor and material, are a very small 
fraction of total production costs. Thus 
there is little short-term response to 
price changes by producers. 
• Its cost is generally a small frac-
tion of the total cost of the products in 
which it is used. Thus consumption is 
relatively price inelastic. 
• Price and production rates of com-
modities are quite unstable, generally 
varying from 1 year to the next by 5 to 
25 percent. 19 
It is in the instability of the price and 
production rates that the true effect is 
exhibited. Examination of production 
and price data for manganese reveals 
many instances where a production in-
crease of 10 percent resulted in a price 
decrease of 20 percent and production 
increases of 5 percent resulting in price 
decreases of 10 percent. In general, such 
a 2 to 1 (price change to production 
change) ratio is also apparent in the 
cobalt cycle. While this is a very simplis-
tic view of a highly complicated process, 
the point is that the effect of the 
relatively sudden placement of the 
metals from the manganese nodules on 
t1:1e market will be out of proportion to 
the fraction of the market which they 
represent.20 Since, in general, com-
modities account for some 90 percent 
of the foreign exchange of the de-
veloping countries,21 it would seem 
their concern is justified. For example, a 
change of only 1 percent in the price of 
copper means $6 million a year in 
foreign exchange to the Government of 
Chile. Further, if the mining companies 
survive the price dip caused by their 
entry, it can be expected that their 
presence will have a continuing destabi-
lizing effect upon the commodity mar-
ket which will affect them as well as the 
land-based producers. These market 
fluctuations thus would appear to be a 
common element linking the land- and 
sea-based producers. It would be in the 
interests of both to preclude a market 
dip when the sea-based metals come 
onto the market and to stabilize the 
market in the long run, that is, to rid 
the market of the major year-to-year 
fluctuations in price. 
Conclusions. Thus we may contend 
that market impact is a common key to 
the problem of deep sea resources. No 
matter what the difference in tech-
nology required or special legal con-
siderations or even the difference of 
humanist philosophies behind the 
mining and extracticm of land- and 
sea-based mineral resources, they face 
common problems in the world market 
place. The central issue in defining a 
policy for exploitation is not how to 
mine the nodules or how to define a 
tract of sea bottom or even who should 
own the sea bottom. It is rather how 
these minerals are to be used after they 
have been extracted from the nodules 
which is critical. A policy defining the 
desired impact that the deep sea miner-
als have upon the international mineral 
market is the one against which all other 
policy considerations should be placed 
in perspective. The choice is simply 
whether the minerals originating from 
the seabed should be used to stabilize an 
unstable commodities market or not. 
The choice is relatively clear. To opt for 
a free market means that, if an interna-
tional regime is to be brought into 
being, each of the subsidiary questions-
such as who owns the seabeds-must be 
dealt with as generally separate, stand-
ing on its own merit. This could be 
expected to lead to a long and acrimoni-
ous series of negotiations, which in turn 
would severely decrease the chances of 
any international settlement. On the 
other hand, once agreement is reached 
on the principle and means of using the 
deep sea minerals to help stabilize the 
world metals market prices, then one 
would expect resolution of all sub-
sidiary questions in a logical and more 
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rapid manner. Since the unstable market 
affects both developed and developing 
nations, it is in the interests of both to 
adopt the premise of stabilization, pro-
vided the strategy of stabilization ap-
pears to be a feasible one. 
Even if one adopts the long· term 
view, as did the U.N. in its Secretary 
General's Report on the Economic Ef-
fects of the Deep Sea Minerals/ 2 the 
shorter term commodity fluctuations 
are important. It is the purpose of the 
Law of the Sea Conference to provide 
legal principles and machinery with 
some enduring qualities. The per-
formance of the international regime 
must be such that it can deal effectively 
with the initial shorter term economic 
problems as well as the long·term issues 
or a crisis of confidence in the useful-
ness of the regime will result. The 
attention span of the lesser developed 
countries is too short to wait for long-
term market expansion. If the interna-
tional regime is to succeed and be 
supported in the long run, considerably 
more attention must be paid to the 
impact of the deep sea minerals on the 
commodity cycles. 
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